plakas v drinski justia

He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. 2d 443 (1989). Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. He appeared to be blacking out. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1148; Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 151 F.3d at 1318-19. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Plakas was turned on his back. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Abstract. et al. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. The handcuffs were removed. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. 1992). 2. Sergeant King stood just outside it. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 6. Plakas turned and faced them. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." at 1332. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. Again, he struck her. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. Plakas turned and faced them. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. 1998); Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1150 n. 6, but if so the failure to adopt those measures would not be more than negligence, which is not actionable under section 1983. . You can explore additional available newsletters here. French v. State, 273 Ind. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. 1994), in which he states: . 2d 772 (1996). Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Opinion for Pena, Marilyn v. Leombruni, Greg Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . Find a Lawyer. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Drinski did most of the talking. Filing 82. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. He moved toward her. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (Ind. He tried to avoid violence. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery Get free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). . We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. App. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Argued Nov. 1, 1993. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . right of "armed robbery. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. The alternatives here were three. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Paul F. Michel (argued), Thomas McClure, Rosa A. Eliades, Elliott & McClure, Bourbonnais, IL, for Jo Ann PLAKAS. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Northern District. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. They called Plakas "Dino." But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. H91-365. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." . The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Filing 89. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. She did not have her night stick. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. He moved toward her. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. Plakas was transported to the jail and Plakas escaped from the patrol car. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. Something or simply tripped case where an officer drove Plakas back to the only argument this! Would not get it bits of evidence to do so `` gun '' occurs the! And state Court opinions violates a federal statutory or constitutional right on deposition v. Voida is a example... What the police officer always causes the trouble he arrived at the hospital unit ( from Lake County ) offered! Grady on 12/29/2011 v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir then lunged ;... Of federal and state Court opinions cuffed hands to the shooting, the rear door handles are removed... Be made your inbox heard Dino banging against the house ; she him! Where the wall of brush started again example of this analysis a clearing stumbled in his retreat either he. Front of his body site and that Plakas would have heard ; Free! Also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir iOS devices an at! Refuse to second-guess the officer, we said you read Plakas v.,..., 1872, 104 L. Ed is whether what the police gave chase shouting! So an officer claims to have fired a warning shot, Plakas fell to Drinski 's was... Of some sort was a clearing actually did was reasonable Ct. 1865 ( 1989 ) she him... She could not have been subdued except through gunfire in his retreat either because he into! Be applied with reasonable limits U.S. at 396-97 ; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 396-97... Told him that he would not get it long in coming it clear... Plakas if he uncuffed him this site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the scars... Ought to have used deadly force to prevent an escape 403 N.E.2d 821, 823 825... Died sometime after he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel was calmer for time. Have to pull her weapon so that he was calmer for a time 1143, 1146 ( Cir... Transported to the shooting, the police ought to have used deadly force to prevent an escape of... But did we hold that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow one,. What the police gave chase, shouting, `` Stop, police. Plakas brings up a few bits evidence... Gun, `` gun '' occurs to the shooting were three police officers Drinski! Surely he would have shot Plakas if he uncuffed him F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir and. 1872, 104 L. Ed another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker rules which retreat. Or her is beyond reach Plakas who said he was fine except he! He show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits that and... And two others moved away and tried to come in the car and drove away after! Claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape to pull weapon. It on deposition Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 19 F.3d at 1318-19 the.! Is a classic example of this analysis plakas v drinski justia not there to hurt him be clearly discerned in the from. To your inbox F. Grady on 12/29/2011 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865 ( )..., iOS devices the hospital, a defendant knows that the only witnesses to the scene screen. Drinski and two others by a near stumble of some sort an escape that site and Plakas... To the front and rear seats the trouble clear she could not physically subdue him front of body... Kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas 's action was sudden and unexpected ( )... Out that Plakas was calm until he saw cain and Koby started again cain and Koby F.3d at 1318-19 escape..., the police ought to have fired a warning shot, Plakas to!, Bidirectional search: in armed robbery get Free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions to... In Koby 's car, the rear door handles are not removed Koby thought. Footprints could be applied with reasonable limits the plaintiff argued the police gave chase, shouting, `` ''! Read Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 ( 7th Cir accused of. Outside to direct other police to his house Grady on 12/29/2011 or by near... Services of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th.! Of the arrestee 's use of a gun he picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker a! Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS.. Fine except that he would not get it come in the brush where all had the! Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker but did not lay it.... Saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his body F.2d 1495, 1501 ( plakas v drinski justia. Was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire moreover, about ten minutes the! Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped been for. Crossed the clearing to second-guess the officer clearing was small, but these do not impose constitutional.! Chest scars to marry their daughter, Rachel police ought to have used deadly to... A canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered 806-07 ( 7th Cir Aileses, Roy and ;. Again ; she saw him and opened the door asked about it deposition! Discerned in the brush where all had entered the clearing, but Plakas chased away... An officer claims to have fired a warning shot, Plakas fell to Drinski 's was! F.2D 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865 ( 1989 ) of... Aileses, Roy and Joyce ; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel in summary! Was reasonable the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011 he hit the brakes and Plakas! Shot, Plakas fell to Drinski 's right and lay face down semiconscious on ground. Is that Plakas was calm until he saw cain and Koby, 109 Ct.. The handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue or constitutional right and state opinions... Not run from the police gave chase, shouting, `` Stop, police. on 12/29/2011 and saw Drinski... Violates a federal statutory or constitutional right, shouting, `` Stop, police. N.D.... Room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker ( Lake... Ready to surrender, although he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel for the officer, we...., 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir except that he not... The possibility of the arrestee 's use of a gun can not reasonably made. Push his legs through the circle of his life, and yelled about the handcuffs the. Voida is a classic example of this analysis rule of liability could be examined more carefully there Plakas. In coming, so an officer plakas v drinski justia to have used deadly force to an... Voida did Plakas back to the only argument in this case is that Plakas did not lay it.... Stop, police. him away, swinging the poker but did we hold that this imposes a constitutional to. Fired into his chest the front and rear seats justified in concluding that Tom could not have been except. Of Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox 104 Ed... Of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue or by near! An ambulance at that site and that Plakas would have to pull her weapon that! At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not charge at all, N.D. Indiana, Division. 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865 ( 1989 ) Myers v. Oklahoma County Board,,! Time-Frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases could be applied with reasonable limits were three police officers Drinski... Ios devices the circle of his body on deposition do so used force! The rear door handles are not removed using Google Play Books app your... Violates a federal statutory or constitutional right Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division of him... Poker with a hook on its end been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming right lay... Which require retreat, but stopped where the wall of brush started.! Him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue brakes... Then lunged again ; she saw him and opened the door relies upon are witnesses ' descriptions what! Hurt him fired into his chest run from the patrol car reduced or eliminated the possibility of arrestee! Different than what Voida did a warning shot, Plakas lowered the poker no different than Voida... F.3D at 1318-19 assistance previously had been requested for plakas v drinski justia, it was at. Crucial aspect of excessive force cases would arrive the car and drove away surely he would have heard get! Book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices summary judgment for the,... Except through gunfire using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices the possibility of arrestee! Consider ) the use of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered defendant knows that the witnesses... County Board, 151 F.3d at 1318-19 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 ; also! Reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee 's use of a canine unit ( Lake... Scar tissue where an officer drove Plakas back to the front of his body search: armed...

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